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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Carlos Adrian Cruz-Romero appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony
driving under the influence. In his appellant’s brief, he argued that the district court
erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that the Intoxilyzer
used to test his breath-alcohol content was not working properly. In response, the State
asks this Court to affirm a ruling that intruded on the province of the jury and deprived
Mr. Cruz-Romero of his constitutional right to defend against the State’s charges. This
reply addresses a handful of shortcomings in the State’s arguments.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning?

II.

Did the district court violate Mr. Cruz-Romero’s constitutional right to present a
complete defense by excluding evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion In Limine To
Exclude Evidence Of The Intoxilyzer Malfunctioning
Mr. Cruz-Romero argued in his appellant’s brief that the district court abused its
discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude the operations log from
his trial, absent expert testimony on the subject.1 The district court first found that the
Intoxilyzer was working properly on the day in question, an issue that should have been
left to the jury.

From that conclusion, the court erroneously found that evidence

showing that the Intoxilyzer was out of tolerance before April 8 and after May 9 was not
relevant and would be excluded from trial. Finally, the court held that Mr. Cruz-Romero
may be able to introduce that evidence to challenge Ms. Cutler’s, but not Deputy
Sedlmayr’s, testimony.
In response, the State first contends that the court’s “‘factual finding’ was neither
erroneous nor binding on a non-existent jury.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State has missed
the point. Mr. Cruz-Romero’s contention (which can hardly be disputed) is that the
court’s finding prevented him from introducing the operations log to call into question the

Mr. Cruz-Romero does not dispute that the court held he could call his own expert
and, if he called that expert, he could then introduce evidence of the malfunctioning as
represented in the logs. But that fact does nothing to salvage the court’s decision.
Mr. Cruz-Romero could properly call into question the reliability of the Intoxilyzer by
using the operations log to cross examine whichever of the State’s witnesses introduced
his breath test results, regardless of whether he called an expert. See State v. Ward,
135 Idaho 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[O]nce the trial court has made the threshold
determination of admissibility [of the test result], a defendant is free to attack the
reliability and accuracy of the admitted evidence through the presentation of evidence at
trial. This evidence could include concessions elicited on cross-examination of the
officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense expert.”) (internal citation
omitted and emphasis added).
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reliability of the Intoxilyzer, unless he called an expert. (App. Br., pp.8–13.) By finding
“that between the certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification on May
9th that it does appear, at least from the logs, that the machine was working properly at
that time” (Tr., p.35, Ls.13–17), the court decided that evidence of the Intoxilyzer
malfunctioning was not relevant, and in turn excluded the operations log from trial. But
the reliability of the Intoxilyzer was an issue for the jury to decide at trial, not an issue for
the court to decide during a motion in limine.
In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879 (Ct. App. 2012)—the principle case on which
Mr. Cruz-Romero relied and which the State wholly failed to mention in its response
brief—gets at the crux of this issue. At an administrative license suspension hearing,
Hubbard sought to introduce evidence of fluctuating performance verification tests done
before and after her breath test.

Id. at 882–83.

The district court excluded that

evidence, concluding that the acceptable performance verification result on the day of
Hubbard’s breath test established, as a matter of law, that the machine was working
correctly. Id. at 883. The Court of Appeals rejected that logic: “‘If there is evidence that
any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to
produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant to both the admissibility
and weight of the test results.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 375
(Ct. App. 1987) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Howell,
122 Idaho 209, 212–13 (Ct. App. 1992)). But because the burden in that case was on
Hubbard, and there was no testimony about the possible causes or significance of the
apparent malfunctioning, the Court of Appeals held that Hubbard did not meet her
burden of showing that the testing equipment had malfunctioned. Id. at 883–84.
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Here, however, the burden is on the State to prove that the Intoxilyzer worked
properly.

State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[t]he burden of

persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the prosecution,” and
thus “‘the reliability and performance of any given machine is subject to challenge.’”)
(quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375). Just as the Court of Appeals in Hubbard rejected
the notion that an acceptable performance verification reading on the day of Hubbard’s
breath test established that the machine worked properly as a matter of law, the district
court here erred by concluding that the Intoxilyzer was working properly and thus
excluding that evidence from trial.
Relatedly, the State’s claim that Mr. Cruz-Romero “did not identify any evidence
that he could present to demonstrate that his specific test results were unreliable or that
the Intoxilyzer malfunctioned at the time of testing” relies on the same misunderstanding
as above. (Resp. Br., p.11.) As an initial matter, the State again overlooks the burden
of proof. At the motion in limine hearing, it was the State’s burden of showing that the
evidence was not relevant and thus should be excluded from trial. See State v. Haynes,
159 Idaho 36, 355 P.3d 1266, 1273 (2015).

Further, Mr. Cruz-Romero sought to

introduce evidence of malfunctioning that was greater than that approved of in Hubbard:
the operations log showed that the Intoxilyzer used to test Mr. Cruz-Romero’s breath on
April 27 tested out of tolerance on April 5, May 15, and May 16 (Tr., p.19, Ls.11–19,
p.21, Ls.8–25; Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 4); the Intoxilyzer did not calibrate properly on August 5,
apparently because of a problem with a solution jar that was used as early as March
2014 (Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.12, L.7; Def. Ex. A, p.7); Deputy Sedlmayr could not say
whether the malfunctions in April and May were related to that jar (Tr., p.23, Ls.4–10);
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and Deputy Sedlmayr could only infer that the Intoxilyzer was working properly on the
day in question (Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.13, L.3, p.24, L.16 – p.25, L.13). See Hubbard,
152 Idaho at 882–83. The State’s assertion that Mr. Cruz-Romero did not identify any
evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning is baseless.
The State correctly notes that Deputy Sedlmayr testified that the Intoxilyzer
would not allow testing to proceed if it was out of tolerance (Resp. Br., p.11), but
overlooks that he also said he did not know whether the Intoxilyzer could malfunction
but not give an out of tolerance reading:
Q: What—can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn’t
show up that it’s out of tolerance but there are still issues with the
instrument?
A: Not that I’m aware of. There’s a lot of different checks and
balances for—and information along those lines. I would have to refer you
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab.
Q: So you don’t have the knowledge to answer that?
A: No.
(Tr., p.22, L.18 – p.23, L.3.) Therefore, even if it were proper for the court to make a
factual finding about whether the Intoxilyzer worked properly in order to determine
whether the evidence was relevant, the State did not meet its burden of proving as
much.
Finally, the State takes issue with Mr. Cruz-Romero’s interpretation of the district
court’s ruling regarding his ability to cross-examine Deputy Sedlmayr. (Resp. Br., p.9.)
The relevant exchange is as follows:
Ms. Scott [the State]: Your Honor, the State had gotten the expert
essentially as rebuttal evidence to show that it was working properly at the
date and time in question. It was a preliminary procedure that we took in
order to have somebody here so that they could testify that, in fact, on that
day, the instrument was working properly.
However, there’s been no expert shown or disclosed to state that it
wasn’t, and that’s the issue here is that there's been no presentation given
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or anybody disclosed that would show that that instrument was not
working properly on the date and time.
The Court: Ms. DePew, is it correct that the defense does not have
an expert in this case?
Ms. DePew [defense counsel]: We do not, Your Honor, but what
the State’s asking us to do is be precluded from cross examining their
expert as to their conclusions. If the expert’s allowed to testify based on
whatever information they have that this machine was working properly,
the defense has a right to question what they base that decision on.
The Court: I agree. If the State calls Ms. Cutler, then you certainly
have a right to examine her as to those issues, but what is the relevance
of this evidence if they do not call Ms. Cutler in their case in chief?
Ms. DePew: Your Honor, I still believe it’s relevant through Officer
Sedlmayr. He’s considered an expert on the breath testing machine. He’s
going to testify that it was working properly. I, again, have a right to cross
examine that opinion.
The Court: All right. The Court is going to—as far as the evidence
of the malfunctioning of the Intox 5000, the evidence before the Court, at
this time, demonstrates that between the certification of the machine on
April 8th and the recertification on May 9th that it does appear, at least
from the logs, that the machine was working properly at that time. There
is no indication about a tolerance.
Presumptively, the State’s evidence will demonstrate the
certification for the Intoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results. Absent
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of
indications that the Intox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th
of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value. And certainly if
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be
admissible at trial. . . .
(Tr., p.34, L.3 – p.36, L.6 (emphasis added).)
The State is correct that the court did not explicitly say that Mr. Cruz-Romero
could not cross examine Deputy Sedlmayr using the operations logs. (Resp. Br., p.9.)
What the court did say is that “[a]bsent expert testimony on the subject, [the operations
log] is not of probative value,” and “certainly if the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler,”
then maybe the operations logs could come in. (Tr., p.35, L.21 – p.36, L.3.) The court
gave no indication that the evidence would be admitted under any other circumstance.
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More importantly, the common thread throughout the above dialogue is that both
the State and the court believed that Mr. Cruz-Romero had the burden at trial of proving
the Intoxilyzer malfunctioned. The State said it listed Ms. Cutler to present “rebuttal
evidence to show that it was working properly at the date and time in question,” and,
according to the court, “[p]resumptively, the State’s evidence will demonstrate the
certification for the Intoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results.” (Tr., p.34, L.4–6, p.35,
Ls.19–21 (emphasis added).) To the contrary, the State still had the burden to prove
the Intoxilyzer results were reliable.

See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (“The burden of

persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the prosecution.”).
Whoever intended to testify as much at trial—whether Ms. Cutler, Deputy Sedlmayr, or
Sergeant West—was subject to cross examination about the reliability of those test
results, and the operation log was a proper way to call those results into question.
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (the defense can challenge breath results by presenting
evidence such as “concessions elicited on cross-examination of the officer who
administered the test”).

The district court’s ruling to the contrary was an abuse of

discretion.
II.
The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero’s Constitutional Right To Present A
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The Intoxilyzer Malfunctioning
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Cruz-Romero argued that the district court’s ruling on
the motion in limine deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete
defense, which includes the right to introduce evidence and cross examine witnesses
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regarding the Intoxilyzer’s performance in order to challenge the validity of his breath
test results. (App. Br., pp.8–14.)
In response, the State contends that Mr. Cruz-Romero did not preserve this issue
for appeal because an objection must state “the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context,” I.R.E. 103(a)(1), and he “never
objected to the state’s motion on constitutional grounds” (Resp. Br., p.12). The State
correctly notes that defense counsel did not specifically state that the court’s ruling
implicated Mr. Cruz-Romero’s constitutional rights, but the State’s claim that he needed
to do so to preserve the issue is baseless.
As an initial matter, the State has overlooked that I.R.E. 103(a)(1) applies only to
objections made to rulings admitting evidence, not excluding it.

Regardless, the

grounds for Mr. Cruz-Romero’s objection were clear. He told the district court that he
had a right to introduce the operations log because “[i]t is up to the jury to decide
whether or not this instrument and the reading that it gave us is something that they
believe establishes the BAC beyond a doubt” (Tr., p.31, Ls.10–14), and that the court’s
ruling “precluded [him] from cross examining their expert as to their conclusions”
(Tr., p.34, Ls.19–21). Therefore, the purpose behind requiring a specific objection—“to
alert the trial court and the other party to the grounds of the objection so that it may be
addressed or cured”—was met. See State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 251 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885 (Ct. App. 2005)). Mr. CruzRomero need not also cite the source of those grounds.

See State v. Almaraz,

154 Idaho 584, 602 (2013) (“Although the rule was not specifically invoked, the
defense’s arguments surrounding Lieutenant Steele’s testimony show that the defense
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was concerned that her conclusion was a lay opinion that was not helpful to a clear
understanding for the jury and was based on specialized knowledge as a police officer
in violation of I.R.E. 701.”). The State’s claim that Mr. Cruz-Romero failed to preserve
this issue because he did not specifically cite the U.S. or Idaho Constitutions is without
merit.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cruz-Romero respectfully asks this Court to vacate his judgment of
conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State’s motion in limine, and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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